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I. INTRODUCTION: WTO MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK
ON COMPETITION POLICY
Competition policy facilitates competition by preventing anti-competitive
conduct. Its objectives are founded in the basic notion that increased
competition in the market fosters better outcomes for consumers in
terms of efficiency, quality and resource allocation. Trade policy also
regulates international trade to enhance economic efficiency and consumer
welfare, mainly by encouraging free trade and market liberalization.1
The interaction between these two distinct yet similar policies has led
to discussions at various international organizations, including, but
not limited to, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).2
The interaction between trade and competition policy became one of
the key issues at the 1996 World Trade Organization's (WTO) Singapore
Ministerial Conference. It was believed that anti-competitive practices,
private or public, undermined the gains made by the WTO with regard to
trade liberalization. This Ministerial Conference established the WTO
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy (WGTCP) to discuss beneficial issues raised by the interaction
of trade and competition policy. The 2001 WTO Doha Ministerial
Conference participants recognized that a multilateral framework could
enhance the contribution of competition policy to international trade and
development.3 The Doha Declaration provided that negotiations would
commence after the Fifth Ministerial Conference, subject to a decision
1. WTO, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy [WGTCP], Report of the WGTCP to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, 22-
23, 1998.
2. Seung Wha Chang, Interaction Between Trade and Competition: Why a
Multilateral Approach for the United States, 14 DuKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 7-10,
2003.
3. World Trade Organization Ministerial Declaration of November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/Dec/l, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. Paragraph 23
states:
Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution
of competition policy to international trade and development, and the need for
enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area as referred to
in paragraph 24, we agree the negotiations will take place after the Fifth
Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by
explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations.
Id. This paragraph represented a compromise between WTO Members that desired an
immediate launch of negotiations on trade and competition policy and those desiring that
work on this subject would continue in a non-negotiating or educational mode.
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on modalities of negotiations.4 In addition, the Declaration authorized
the WGTCP to clarify "core principles, including transparency, non-
discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore cartels;
modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive
reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries
through capacity building. 5
Several developing countries expressed opposition to the multilateral
framework even before the Doha Ministerial Conference. They argued
that such an approach would be controversial, if not unhelpful.. India's
representatives stated that, instead of developing multilateral rules, the
WGTCP should continue to study this issue because it is too complex
and WTO members were far from agreement.7 Brazil argued that there is
a need to consider differing levels of development and cultural contexts
for these regimes, as well as the difference in available resources for this
purpose and levels of institutional development. 8 These arguments led to
the adoption of Paragraph 24 of the Doha Declaration, which emphasizes
developing countries' need for enhanced technical assistance and
capacity building, and Paragraph 25, which states that full account




6. Ajit Singh, Multilateral Competition Policy and Economic Development: A
Developing Country Perspective on the European Community Proposals at 2 (presented
at the 5th session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and
Policy at Geneva, July 2-4, 2003); see also WTO Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy [WGTCP], Report on the WGTCP Meeting of
2-3 October, WT/WGTCP/M/12, 1 35 (Nov. 8, 2000).
7. WTO, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy [WGTCP], Report on the WGTCP Meeting of 19-20 April, WT/WGTCP/M/8,
20 (June 10, 1999). India argued "(t)he WGTCP was in an exploratory and educative
process and was still a long way off from the point where it could be in a position to
gauge the need for multilateral rules." Id.
8. Id. T22.
9. Doha Declaration, supra note 3, at TT 24, 25. Paragraph 24 states:
We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for
enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity building in this area,
including policy analysis and development so that they may better evaluate the
implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their development policies
and objectives, and human and institutional development. To this end, we shall
work in cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organisations,
including UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels,
to provide strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond to
these needs.
After the Doha Ministerial Conference, the WGTCP made substantial
progress regarding the linkage of trade, competition and development.
The primary objectives of the WGTCP were to foster economic
development, recognizing that competition policy can serve the needs of
industrial policy to promote global economic efficiency and consumer
benefits; to increase the presence of active competition authorities in all
markets and enhance voluntary cooperation among these authorities; and
finally, to maintain a high degree of national independence in administering
competition policy.'0
As mandated by the Doha Declaration, Ministers were to decide by
explicit consensus on the modalities of negotiations on a multilateral
framework on competition at Cancun in 2003. However, a bargaining
impasse among the developed and developing members resulted in a
failure to reach an agreement. The United States and the European
Union were not willing to sufficiently reduce their own agricultural
subsidies to strongly argue for concessions by the developing countries
on the framework for competition policy." The Cancun package collapsed
as a whole. The European Union, the strongest proponent for a multilateral
approach, gave up its single undertaking approach in the WTO and
decided to promote a multilateral approach.1 2 As a result, competition,
along with the other Singapore issues, was removed from the Doha
Round negotiations in July 2004.'1 At present, almost all the work done
to lead to a multilateral framework on competition has been suspended.
This paper argues that a multilateral framework on competition policy
would benefit the developing countries by promoting their economic
development. Section II of this paper briefly introduces the multilateral
framework, as proposed mainly by the EC at the WGTCP (hereinafter
"Proposed Framework"). The article goes on to outline the developing
countries' opposing positions to the Proposed Framework, and demonstrates
10. Alan W. Wolff, Remarks on Launching Competition Policy Negotiations in the
WTO: Relevant Considerations (before Global Business Dialogue at the Cancun WTO
Ministerial September 13, 2003), http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/launching_
competitionpolicy.htm.
11. Anup Shah, WTO Meeting in Cancun, Mexico 2003, available at http://
www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/Cancun.asp (last visited on Mar. 13,
2006).
12. Commission of the European Communities, Reviving the DDA Negotiations-
the EU Perspective, Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the
European Parliament, and to the Economic and Social Committee, COM(2003)734 final
(Nov. 26, 2003), available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003/november/
tradoc_1 14259.pdf. In this Communication, the EC Commission also stated that this was
the only way to develop rules on Singapore issues because not all Members were ready
to take the step now or in the future. Id.
13. WTO, Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1
August 2004, 1 .g. A general outline of this so-called "July Package" is available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/ddae/drafttextgc-dg_3 ljulyO4_e.htm.
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that the concerns raised are not as significant as they argue. Section III
recapitulates why a WTO multilateral framework on competition is
beneficial to the developing countries' developmental needs. Section IV
suggests some possible development-oriented revisions to the Proposed
Framework. Section V concludes by urging "developing countries" to
take a courageous yet wise step towards re-engaging in negotiations for
a multilateral framework on competition policy.
II. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, OPPOSITIONS AND
COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. The Proposed Framework
The Havana Charter's goal regarding restrictive business practices is
definitely not the goal of the WGTCP discussions. 14 The Proposed
Framework basically consists of two features: a ban on hardcore cartels1
5
and conformity of domestic competition laws with the core WTO
principles. The Proposed Framework requires every WTO member to
adopt measures prohibiting hardcore cartels, but the members are given
autonomy to include certain provisions or exemptions into their
competition regime.' 6 The only condition is that they meet certain WTO
principles of most-favored nation treatment (MFN), non-discrimination,
14. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization, ch. V, art. 46(1), U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Apr.
1948). Article 46 (1) of the Havana Charter states as follows:
Each Member shall take appropriate measures and shall co-operate with the
Organization to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial
enterprises, business practices affecting international trade which restrain
competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever
such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade
and interfere with the achievement of any of the other objectives set forth in
Article 1.
15. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defines hard-
core cartels as anticompetitive agreements, anticompetitive concerted practices or
anticompetitive arrangements by competitors "to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive
tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by allocating
customers, suppliers, territories or lines of commerce." Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective
Action Against Hard Core Cartels at 3, C(98)3 5/FINAL (Mar. 25, 1998).
16. For a general overview of the proposal, see WTO Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication from the European
Community and its Member States: A WTO Competition Agreement's Contribution to
International Cooperation and Technical Assistance for Capacity-Building, WT/WGTCP/
W/184 (Apr. 18, 2002).
national treatment, transparency and procedural fairness. The members
must also establish a mechanism for mandatory consultation and
cooperation on hardcore cartels; cooperation regarding other matters is
voluntary. A WTO Competition Policy Committee would be established
to monitor a future agreement, facilitate cooperation, conduct peer
reviews and facilitate exchanges of information. 17 An integrated approach
to technical assistance and capacity building would also be provided for
the developing countries.
This Proposed Framework is undoubtedly modest compared to those
proposed earlier in the discussion. 8 It does not advocate WTO members
adopt a full set of competition laws. Instead, it only involves a minimum set
of reasonable rules. ' 9 It does not aim at a comprehensive harmonization of
domestic competition laws, but takes into consideration the peculiarities of
national circumstances.2 ° It is framed in terms of adherence to certain
core principles that embody fundamental values of both competition
policy and the multilateral trading system. It deliberately leaves broad
leeway for the continuing adaptation of national approaches to competition
policy in response to economic learning and individual circumstances. It
responds to the key concerns raised by critics of a multilateral approach
in the WTO, 21 and seems to be in harmony with the interests of
development.
22
B. Developing Countries' Oppositions and Counterarguments
The WGTCP definitely failed in reaching a consensus for a multilateral
framework on competition policy, as many countries continuously expressed
opposition. The basic foundation of such opposition was the lack of
consensus on the robustness of the link between trade and competition,
and whether such a linkage is sufficiently strong to call for a multilateral
17. For a more detailed description of the proposal, see WTO Working Group on
the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication from the
European Community and its Member States, Dispute Settlement and Peer Review:
Options for a WTO Agreement on Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/229 (May 9,
2003).
18. For a historical survey of international debates on international competition
law/policy, see Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J.
INT'L L. 911, 925-32 (2003); Chang, supra note 2, at 14-20.
19. Singh, supra note 6, at 10.
20. Ignacio Garcia-Bercero & Stefan Amarasinha, Moving the Trade and
Competition Debate Forward, 4(3) J. INT'L ECON. L. 481, 481-506 (2001); see also WTO
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication
from the European Community and its Member States: Core Principles, WT/WGTCP/
W/222 (Nov. 19, 2002).
21. Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 479-504 (2000).
22. Singh, supra note 6, at 25.
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competition policy. 23 Responding to such a theoretical question is
outside the scope of this paper. This paper focuses only on contrasting
opinions from the perspective of the developing countries.
1. A One-Size-Fits-All Approach
Very few developing countries have competition laws. Many of the
least-developed countries have no competition legislation at all. Of the
90 or so developing countries that now have competition laws, most
were enacted during the 1990s. 24 Moreover, even among countries that
have competition laws, the content and enforcement of those laws differ
depending on economic resources and institutional capacity. Thus, it has
been argued that an appropriate competition policy must differ among
countries depending on their level of development, on the state of their
governance and on many other factors.25 The main concern is based on
the belief that the Proposed Framework should pursue a case-by-case
rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.
In fact, the Proposed Framework does not inhibit the development of
national approaches to competition policy that accords with nations'
individual circumstance.26 The Proposed Framework is not based on a
one-size-fits-all approach, but merely urges members to adopt the core
principles of the WTO in their competition regime. The "multilateral"
approach should be distinguished from the more extreme "uniform"
approach, which advocates for a single global antitrust law.
2. Burden on Developing Countries
Developing countries have also argued that some members lack the
capacity to implement competition laws. In order for competition policy
23. Id. at 6.
24. Of the 38 jurisdictions that enacted competition laws in the 1990s, 27 were
developing countries. SIMON J. EVENETT, LINKS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND
COMPETITION LAW IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Oct. 28, 2003).
25. See, e.g., WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy, Report on the WGTCP Meeting of JO-11 June 1999, WT/WGTCP/
M/9, 30-31 (Aug. 4, 1999).
26. Robert Anderson & Frddric Jenny, Competition Policy, Economic Development
and the Multilateral Trading System: Overview of the Linkages and Current Proposals
for an Agreement in the WTO 11, paper presented at the 28th Pacific Trade and
Development Conference on Competition Policy in the New Millenium, Makati,
Philippines (2002), available at http://dirp3.pids.gov.ph/paftad/documents/Conference.
Papers/PAPER.CP.ECONDEV.PDF.
to become effective, the appropriate social and legal culture of
competition and competition policy must evolve, a process that can take
time, perhaps decades. Serious enforcement requires education and
political support. 27 Developing countries will also bear the burden
of adjustment costs created by new regulations and enforcement
mechanisms. 28 Thus, the argument that developing countries lack the
resources and experience to participate meaningfully and fully in a
multilateral competition policy is a convincing one. In a submission to
the WGTCP, Thailand stressed its financial constraints and argued that
competition agencies in developing countries need financial compensation
and should be allowed to cooperate to the extent possible, subject to
their technical and financial constraints.29
The Proposed Framework, realizing that such implementation obligations
are unrealistic and burdensome to developing countries, does not bind
developing countries to these constraints. By inserting provisions for
technical assistance and capacity building, the seemingly heavy burden
on developing countries is shared among the members, and particularly
with developed countries. Detailed modalities must undergo a process
of negotiation, one that is currently impossible.
In fact, developing countries' fear about excessive implementation
costs may be exaggerated. 30 The ultimate effectiveness of any competition
policy in developing countries will be tested by weighing the beneficial
impacts against the cost of implementation. Competition policy can
bring important benefits to the poor, but at the same time, overly
elaborate institutions must be avoided.31 Although a cost-benefit analysis
cannot be derived from a few case studies, the case of Peru provides a
good example of a situation in which the benefits exceed implementation
costs. In the first three years of the Peruvian Competition Agency's
(Indecopi) operation, the economic benefits resulting from the
27. F.M. Scherer, International Trade and Competition Policy 18, (ZEW Indus.
Econ. & Int'l Mgmt Series, Discussion Paper No. 96-26, 1996).
28. Myriam Vander Stichele, What is Wrong with Competition Negotiations in the
WTO? The Problems of a Competition Policy Agreement, in INVESTMENT AND
COMPETITION NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WTO-WHAT'S WRONG WITH IT AND WHAT ARE THE
ALTERNATIVES? (Vanya Walker-Leigh & Alexandra Wandel eds., 2002), available at
http://www.s2bnetwork.org.
29. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Communication from Thailand, WT/WGTCP/W/213, T 6 ( Sept. 23, 2002).
30. See WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Study on Issues Relating to a Possible Multilateral Framework on Competition
Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/228, at 52-73 (May 19, 2003), available at http://www.jmcti.org/
2000round/co/doha/wg/wtwgtcpw_228.pdf.
31. Neil McCulloch, L. Alan Winters & Xavier Cirera, TRADE LIBERALIZATION
AND POVERTY: A HANDBOOK 350-51 (Centre for Economic Policy Research eds., 200 1),
available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/pdfs/tlpov.pdf.
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intensification of competition amounted to $120 million, as compared
with $20 million in operating cost.3 2 This does not, of course, necessarily
mean that high implementation costs are irrelevant or unimportant; an
amount that seems small by developed countries' standards is of
significance to the least-developed countries.
3. Limitation of Developing Countries' Policy Options
Developing countries also argue that a multilateral approach would
limit their policy options and autonomy when pursuing economic
development. Other policies, such as industrialization policy, may play
a more pivotal role in developing countries' pursuit of economic
development than competition policy. 33 In some cases, competition may
need to be restricted to achieve economic efficiency, and anti-competitive
practices may need to be permitted to target other development goals or
to achieve economies of scale. Developing countries may want to protect
small or mid-sized companies and infant industries that compete with
large multinationals that possess far better access to finance or global
marketing networks. In fact, some developing countries, which provide
a far from an ideal setting for competition and where basic market
concepts are not understood, may benefit from having no competition
policy at all.
If, indeed, the Proposed Framework goes to the extreme and fosters
homogenous competition policy objectives among WTO members, it
will deprive the developing countries of very important developmental
instruments.3 4 Simply adopting U.S. or EU competition laws would do
little to assist the economic development of developing countries. 35 The
Proposed Framework does not designate the objectives of competition
law or policy. Although still a subject of considerable debate, it is
generally accepted in developed countries that the goals of competition
policy are to ensure a competitive market, to protect consumer welfare
32. Armando Caceres, INDECOPI'S FIRST SEVEN YEARS 60-63 (B. Boza ed., 2000).
33. For a description of the relationship between competition policy and industrial
policy, see generally McCULLOC et al., supra note 31, at 11-42.
34. Ajit Singh, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets:
International and Developmental Dimensions 15-16 (UNCTAD, G-24 Discussion Paper
Series No. 18, 2002), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2418_en.pdf
35. Id.
and to enhance economic efficiency.36 But under the Proposed Framework,
developing countries may choose whatever policy, industrial or socio-
political, they feel necessary. Developing countries may pursue other
non-efficiency-based economic objectives or even non-economic
objectives. One good example is South Africa's competition law, which
lists six objectives for its 1998 Competition Act, including the
promotion of a greater spread of ownership, and in particular, increased
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons. 37 Developing
countries will not be hindered from pursuing their respective competition
policy objectives.
4. Concerns Regarding Market Access
Although it was agreed that market access would not be the focus of
discussions at the WGTCP, market access issues were nonetheless a
concern for the developing countries. Some members expressed
concerns that excessive emphasis on market access objectives may
distort the principles of competition policy and detrimentally affect the
interests of developing countries.38 Concerns were raised because the
developed countries had asserted that obstacles to market access, which
are prevalent in developing countries, are in clear breach of competition
principles and should therefore be subject to greater scrutiny. 39 The
market access debate reflects most distinctly the divide between those
members who wish to pursue direct negotiations on competition policy
and those who do not.
The focus of the Proposed Framework has shifted from securing
market access to one of promoting the development of effective national
competition regimes and expanding international cooperation to address
anti-competitive practices. The Proposed Framework does not give
market access objectives a privileged position at the expense of more
broadly-based goals of competition law and policy, such as economic
efficiency, consumer welfare and economic development. 4' Thus,
developing countries need not worry about developed countries utilizing
36. Debra A. Valentine, Asst Dir., Int'l Antitrust Div. FTC, Remarks before the
Pacific Council Conference on Trade and Competition Policy: The Goals of Competition
Law (May 13-14, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvspeech.htm.
37. Competition Act 89 of 1998 s. 2 (S. Afr.).
38. Tarullo, supra note 21, at 483; see Diane P. Wood, When is Market Access
Really 'Market Access'?, 24 INT'L Bus. LAW. 492 (1996).
39. Robert D. Anderson & Peter Holmes, Competition Policy and the Future of the
Multilateral Trading System, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 539, 540-41 (2002).
40. See Edward M. Graham, "Internationalizing" Competition Policy: An Assessment
of the Two Main Alternatives, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 947, 952-53 (2003).
41. Anderson & Jenny, supra note 26, at 3, 11-12.; see also Anderson & Holmes,
supra note 39, at 559-60.
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the multilateral framework on competition to gain market access to
developing countries.
III. THE RATIONALE FOR A WTO MULTILATERAL
FRAMEWORK APPROACH
The arguments presented by developing countries against the Proposed
Framework and their counterarguments were outlined in Section II. This
section illustrates why a strong justification still exists for developing
countries to pursue a WTO multilateral framework, notwithstanding the
possible drawbacks mentioned above.
A. Competition Policy and Economic Development
One rationale for a multilateral framework on competition policy is
based on domestic considerations. Developing countries recognize that
the adoption of competition policy could lead to efficient allocation of
resources, which would foster economic development. Although the
nature of the relationship between competition and development is
somewhat unclear,42 studies show that competition enhances dynamic
economic performance.4 3 Competition among firms sharpens incentives
to cut cost and improve productivity. Active enforcement of competition
laws improves the allocation of resources and plays a direct role in
promoting long-term economic performance.
With worldwide deregulation, privatization and liberalization, competition
policy also plays a complementary role to other trade or market policies.
Developing countries now liberalize and integrate their markets into the
global economy. However, the benefits of an open market economy
cannot be fully realized when restrictions on competition exist.44 A
comparative study on the role of competition policy has shown that
developing countries in Africa and South Asia, moving away from
protectionism, have integrated competition regimes while promoting
vigorous market economies.4 5  This study also showed that benefits
42. See generally James R. Tybout, Manufacturing Finns in Developing Countries:
How Well Do They Do, and Why?, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 11-44 (2000).
43. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, supra note 30, at 28-29.
44. Asian Development Bank, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 2005, at 246 (2005).
45. Consumer Unity and Trust Society, The 7-Up Project: A Comparative Study of
Competition Regimes in Select Developing Countries of the Commonwealth (2001),
available at http://cuts-international.org/7-up%20project.htm.
cannot be realized from trade reform, deregulation and privatization
without active and effective enforcement of competition law.
The cases of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan support these conclusions.
The existence of vibrant competition agencies in these countries was an
important factor leading to the adoption of open market policies through
the agencies' advocacy function.46 The importance of such activities and
their contribution to the process of economic reform and development
cannot be overemphasized. 47 Competition policy reinforces-and is
instrumental in-the implementation of a range of related economic
reforms taken by the developing countries in their progression towards a
market economy. Conversely, a failure to implement competition policy
and related regulatory reforms can prevent countries from realizing the
potential gains from liberalization.
A commitment to a multilateral framework on competition policy
would allow developing countries to pursue the fundamental goal of
economic development. Competition policy itself complements and
reinforces market reforms through liberalization, privatization and regulatory
reforms. It is also useful in overcoming protectionist resistance from
interest groups, and thus provides momentum for reforms.48 In other
words, international agreements may assist developing countries in
prevailing over "political market failures" or rent-seeking activities that
reduce welfare and impede development.4 9 Furthermore, a multilateral
agreement has the potential to assist governments to implement policies
by promoting the building of institutional and enforcement capacity and
providing opportunities for international cooperation. 50 Indeed, the
Proposed Framework could play a crucial role in enabling developing
countries to implement effective policies in this area by promoting
cooperative approaches to institution-building and enforcement, and by
46. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy [WGTCP], Annual Report of the WGTCP to the General Council, 34, 45, 109,
WT/WGTCP/2 (1998).
47. Id. 51, 53.
48. Nancy Birdsall & Robert Z. Laurence, Deep Integration and Trade Agreements:
Good for Developing Countries? in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION rN THE 21ST CENTURY 136-37 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A.
Stem eds., 1999).
49. Robert D. Anderson & Fr~ddric Jenny, Internal Reform as a Necessary
Condition for Realizing the Benefits of Trade Liberalization: the Case of Regulatory
Reform and Competition Policy, in WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries,
The Policy Relevance of Mainstreaming Trade Into Country Development Strategies:
Perspectives of Least-Developed Countries, WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1 5/Rev. 1 at 70-77 (2001).
50. Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Legal, Economic and Political Objectives of National
and International Competition Policies: Constitutional Functions of WTO "Linking
Principles "for Trade and Competition, 34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 145, 156, 159 (1999).
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providing a tool for prevailing over domestic constituencies that might
otherwise block the reform process.51
B. Effective Responses to International Hardcore Cartels
The main objective of competition policy is to deter anti-competitive
practices and to provide remedies for specific abuses such as cartels,
monopolies or anti-competitive mergers that raise the price and/or
reduce the quality and availability of goods and services.52 These issues
are no longer exclusively the concern of developed countries; there is
growing recognition that anti-competitive practices directly impact the
welfare and development prospects of developing countries.53
Hardcore cartels provide a relatively undisputed high-ground for
multilateral competition policy. In fact, hardcore cartels are widely
regarded as the basis of the strongest argument in favor of competition
policy. 54 Korea has stated that regulations on cartels should be included
in the multilateral framework on competition policy because of their
significant, negative effect on international trade.55  Studies have
indicated that international cartels raise the cost of imports from
developed to developing countries by billions of dollars annually.56
Competition authorities in developing countries are unable to effectively
combat cartels due to a lack of resources. Unless competition authorities
51. See, e.g., Ignacio Garcia Bercero & Stefan D. Amarasinha, Moving the Trade
and Competition Debate Forward, J. INT'L EcoN. L. 481, 481-506 (2000); Anderson &
Holmes, supra note 39, at 541.
52. Anderson & Holmes, supra note 39, at 532-33, 541-45.
53. Fr~dric Jenny, Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Convergence,
Divergence and Cooperation in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICIES 31-70 (Yang-Ching Chao, Gee San, Changfa Lo & Jiming Ho eds., 2001);
see generally Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, Private International Cartels and
Their Effect on Developing Countries (World Bank's World Development Report
2001, Background Paper No. 27826, 2001), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/02/1 0/000265513_20040210163259/Rendered/P
DF/wdr27826.pdf.
54. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, supra note 30, at 60-63, 96-98. For an in-depth analysis see Margaret Levenstein,
Valerie Suslow & Lynda Oswald, International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing
Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies, (Political Economy Research
Institute (PERI) University of Massachusetts Amherst, Working Paper Series, No. 53,
2003).
55. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Communication from Korea, 4, WTIWGTCP/W/200 (Aug. 12, 2002).
56. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, supra note 30, at 92-96.
in developing countries can obtain the cooperation of their counterparts
in the developed countries, their consumers will unwillingly bear the
high cost incurred by cartels. In the recent Vitamin case, developing
countries were unable to obtain the cooperation of developed countries,
even when their importers and consumers were severely hurt.57
At present, no legal structure exists for assisting developing countries
in their efforts to restrain cartels. Thailand, in its submission to the
WGTCP, recognized the potential damage caused by international
cartels and the urgent need to eradicate their cross-border collusive
practices. 58 Cartels tend to operate in countries in which competition laws
are weakly enforced, and multilateral assistance is therefore necessary to
fight these cartels. Without a minimum global standard for national
cartel enforcement, hardcore cartels are likely to target jurisdictions with
weak or non-existent anti-cartel measures, particularly the developing
countries.
Competition policy at the national level is of critical importance.
However, it is severely inadequate for certain issues. In today's global
world, developing countries are unable to protect themselves, and must
therefore cooperate with other competition authorities to combat the
anti-competitive effects of international cartels and mergers that harm
their consumers. 59 This is particularly true because harms caused in these
countries have a global spill-over effect. While developed countries can
alleviate these problems through bilateral agreements, developing
countries cannot, because they lack the influence and power to obtain
such cooperation. Bilateral cooperation arrangements are usually entered
into by developed countries, and developing countries are left out of
such arrangements.60 Developing countries are therefore left with few
options other than to endure anti-competitive practices.
The Proposed Framework identifies the importance of international
hardcore cartels in distorting the world trading system. It has further
correctly identified two of the policy-related reasons for sub-optimal
57. Id. at 99.
58. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Communication from Thailand, 2.1, WTIWGTCP/W/213 (Sept. 23, 2003).
59. Levenstein and Suslow assert that
[e]xamining these sixteen products-which were cartelized at some point
during the 1990s and for which we were able to obtain reasonably reliable
trade data-the total value of such "cartel-affected" imports to developing
countries was $81.1 billion. This made up 6.7% of all imports to developing
countries. It is equal to 1.2% of their combined GDP.
Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 53, at 12.
60. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Communication from the European Community and its Member States at 2,
WT/WGTCP/W/184 (Apr. 22, 2002), available at http://www.jmcti.org/2000round/
comdoha/wg/wtwgtcpwl 84.pdf.
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levels of enforcement: ineffective or non-existent national cartel
enforcement regimes and inadequate information exchange. The Proposed
Framework provides solutions for problems that cannot be solved
through bilateral cooperation. In fact, it assists developing countries in
addressing hardcore cartels that impose significant costs on their
national economies.
C. The WTO, an Appropriate Forum?
While recognizing the necessity of adopting a multilateral approach,
some argue that the WTO is not an appropriate forum for dealing with
competition issues. They argue the WTO is overloaded with other
problems, and should not undertake as complex a project and enormous
a challenge as competition policy. Some have suggested that UNCTAD,
which has already adopted a Set of Principles on Restrictive Business
Practices, serve as an alternative forum. UNCTAD currently supports
developing countries in designing competition policy rules more suited
to their development needs.
6 1
However, the WTO is better suited to coordinate worldwide cooperation.
A multilateral framework on competition within the WTO would allow
developing countries to seek direct assistance from an extensive network
of competition authorities. 62 The WTO is currently the only global
economic body and is perceived to be the only appropriate forum by
nearly all proponents of global antitrust policy. 63 Discussions on the
complex issues regarding the interaction between trade and competition
are also possible within the WTO's framework. Furthermore, a WTO
approach works as a building block for integrating developing countries
into the trading system. The WTO also provides a forum for the exchange
of interests. Developing countries may be able to obtain support in other
areas by agreeing to adopt the Proposed Framework. As the discussions
in Cancun demonstrated, a consensus on this issue requires developed
countries to offer concessions in other trade areas in exchange for the
61. Stichele, supra note 28, at 14.
62. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Communication from the European Community and its Member States: The
Development Dimension of Competition Law and Policy at 9, WT/WGTCP/W/140 (June
8, 2000).
63. Fox, supra note 18, at 925.
support of developing countries. 64 The fact that the WTO is the only
body with the breadth of jurisdiction to enable such an exchange must be
given significant weight.
IV. A DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED FRAMEWORK?
The ability of developing countries to benefit from negotiations on a
multilateral framework on competition policy at the WTO depends on a
number of factors. No outcomes can be guaranteed. A general cost-
benefit analysis will not persuade developing countries to engage in such
negotiations, because the real costs and benefits will vary according to
their individual circumstances. We will also have to wait for future
negotiations to actually see how a multilateral framework will benefit
the interests of the developing countries. Such a framework must
respect the core principles of competition policy; permit and facilitate
their continuing elaboration in response to economic learning and other
developments; and build on the institutional and other strengths of such
policy. Careful assessment of the Proposed Framework, with particular
attention to factors such as implementation costs and consistency with
development objectives shows that it seemingly responds to these
concerns.
Notwithstanding the foregoing observation, this paper does not
suggest that the Proposed Framework necessarily addresses all of the
concerns of developing countries. The fundamental opposition to this
Proposed Framework by many developing countries stems from the
belief that the Proposed Framework is not "development-oriented."
Indeed, it is argued that the basic concepts used in the discourse at
WGTCP are inimical to the interests of developing countries, and new
definitions and concepts are required to adequately address their
concerns. 65 It is important to note that the Proposed Framework is just
that-a 'framework' rather than a complete set of agreements. Through
further discussion and negotiation, the Proposed Framework can focus
more significantly on economic development. By adding necessary elements
to assist developing countries, a multilateral framework on competition
policy will complement other national objectives and policies of the
developing countries.
In the following paragraphs, this paper will suggest several elements
that should be emphasized to make the Proposed Framework more
development-oriented. The first is the inclusion of special and differential
64. Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from
Intellectual Property, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 933, 951 (2003).
65. Singh, supra note 34, at 18.
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treatment, which was also emphasized in the Doha Ministerial Declaration.66
This would mean that "development dimensions" would be valid
grounds for differential treatment of countries with different capacities.
Negotiations on transitional periods, exceptions and exemptions from
the Multilateral Framework will have to be negotiated. In general,
competition policy should be adopted gradually and flexibly, in a
manner suitable to the member countries' level of development and their
development interests, and in a way that does not undermine their socio-
political policies. Such a "flexible" and "progressive" approach will allow
developing countries more autonomy in implementing competition policies.
In its submission to the WGTCP, Thailand insisted on building in
special and differential treatment for developing countries to the core
principles of competition policy. 67 The EC has also stated that least-
developed countries and smaller economies should be allowed to adopt
new WTO obligations pertaining to competition policy in a flexible and
progressive manner.68
The second element is voluntary cooperation in the development of
national legislation and the exchange of national experience, in addition
to the enforcement process. This would broaden the coverage of
approaches already in force under existing "soft" cooperation agreements at
the bilateral and regional level, to which developing countries are not
69parties.
The third element is technical assistance and capacity building, which
will assume greater importance as discussions intensify about the
developmental consequences of a credible competition policy. Developing
economies have raised concerns about the implementation costs of
potential disciplines regarding competition policy. These concerns have
been echoed by certain trade policy experts. 70 Technical assistance and
support for capacity building would address developing countries'
concerns over the perceived lack of institutional capacity and experience
66. See Doha Declaration, supra note 3.
67. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Communication from India, WT/WGTP/W/212 (2002).
68. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Communication from Thailand, WT/WGTCP/W/215 (Sept. 24, 2002).
69. Robert D. Anderson & Frrdrric Jenny, Current Developments on Competition
Policy in the World Trade Organization, 16 ANTITRUST 40, 43 (2001).
70. See, e.g., L. Alan Winters, Doha and the World Poverty Targets 31-32 (paper
presented at the World Bank's 14th Annual Bank Conference on Development
Economics, Washington D.C. (2002)), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTABCDEWASHINGTON2002/Resources/Winters.pdf.
in this area, and would reduce the burden of implementing cooperation
policies on developing countries. The inclusion of technical assistance
provisions in the Doha Declaration was one of the key elements that
enabled many developing countries to accept potential WTO
negotiations on competition policy. Future negotiations should tailor
technical assistance according to the diversity of needs and distinct
national circumstances of developing countries.
V. CONCLUSION
In July 2004, formal negotiations on a multilateral framework on
competition policy at the WTO were deferred for the time being. In the
absence of multilateral negotiations, developing countries are now free
to develop their own competition regime. They are also free not to adopt
any competition law. But as this article has argued, developing countries
should realize the benefits of a multilateral approach and reconsider
discussions at the WTO.
There is a pragmatic reason for developing countries to advocate for
the revival of the discussions on a multilateral framework on competition
policy. By pushing competition policy as well as other Singapore issues
off the negotiating table, developing countries have actually surrendered
an important issue for which trade-offs could have been made.
Exploiting these bargaining chips is at the heart of multilateral trade
negotiations and the associated give-and-take would have allowed the
developing countries to maximize their benefits. In fact, the developing
countries could have approached market access concerns from a
different perspective. Developing countries could have utilized the
multilateral framework on competition and its negotiations to improve
the market access conditions of the developed countries. They could
have strongly insisted on dealing with anti-dumping issues in the
competition context. Of course, there is no guarantee that the European
Union and the United States would be willing to make concessions on
these issues, 71 but including anti-dumping and subsidy issues in a more
comprehensive framework on competition would allow developing
countries to emphasize clear interests.
Developing countries can best promote development by committing
themselves to stronger multilateral rules and trying to benefit from the
commitments made by the developed countries. Developing countries can
utilize a multilateral approach to further their individual and collective
71. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Can
Developing Economies Benefit from WTO Negotiations on Binding Disciplines for Hard
Core Cartels?, at 27-28, U.N. Doe. UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2003/3 (2003) (prepared by
Simon J. Evenett).
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72interests. Active participation by developing countries could also tilt
the balance in their favor. They could robustly demand a flexible and
progressive approach to all commitments, recognizing differences in
development, legal and business cultures. They could insist on enhanced
capacity-building efforts during the negotiations rather than after their
conclusion. This paper stems from the belief that a multilateral
framework will foster a "competition culture" among the developing
countries. It was a humble wish met with opposition. However,
discussions on a multilateral competition policy at the WTO should not
be suspended. The WGTCP should, at the very least, continue to serve
as a forum for discussion on these issues. Without such discussion,
developing countries as well as developed countries will be unable to
reap the benefits from the multilateral approach. Discussions at the
WTO, with more participating members than any other forum, would
also help expand "competition culture." Promotion of consumer benefits,
economic efficiency and economic development are worthy goals. The
liberalization of world trade accomplished by GATT over the course of
four decades is the primary source of progress made toward meeting
these goals. A possible framework on competition at the WTO will
build on that progress.
72. Id. at 31.
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